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Shaanxi Normal University, xi’an, Shaanxi, 710119, China
Abstract. With the advantages of both classical and quantum secret
sharing, many practical hybrid quantum secret sharing have been pro-
posed. In this paper, we propose a hybrid quantum secret sharing scheme
based on mutually unbiased bases and monotone span program. First,
the dealer sends the shares in the linear secret sharing to the partici-
pants in the authorization set via a secure channel. Then, the dealer and
participants perform unitary transformation on a d-dimensional quan-
tum state sequentially, and the dealer publishes the measurement result
confidentially to the participants in the authorization set to recover the
secret. The verifiability of the scheme is guaranteed by the Hash func-
tion. Next, the correctness and security of the scheme are proved and
our scheme is secure against the general eavesdropper attacks. Finally,
a specific example is employed to further clarify the flexibility of the
scheme and the detailed comparison of similar quantum secret sharing
schemes also shows the superiority of our proposed scheme.
Keywords: Quantum secret sharing · Mutually unbiased bases · Veri-
fiability · Access structure.
1 Introduction
As a combination of cryptography and quantum mechanics, quantum cryp-
tography plays an important role in cryptography. Compared with classical
cryptography on the basis of computational complexity, quantum cryptography
based on the laws of quantum physics can achieve unconditional security. Many
branches of quantum cryptography have been developed, such as quantum key
distribution(QKD)[1,2], quantum key agreement(QKA)[3-5], quantum secure di-
rect communication(QSDC)[6,7], quantum teleportation[8,9], quantum signa-
ture[10,11], quantum authentication[12-14], quantum secret sharing(QSS)[15-30]
and so on.
Quantum secret sharing (QSS) is an important research field in quantum
cryptography, which means that the dealer divides a secret into several shadows
and sends them to multiple participants. Only the participants in authorized
sets can recover the secret, and the participants in unauthorized sets can not
recover the secret. Since Hillery et al. [15] proposed the first quantum secret
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sharing scheme by using GHZ state in 1999, a growing number of QSS schemes
[16-30] have been proposed. For example, Williams et al. [22] described and
experimentally demonstrated a three-party quantum secret sharing protocol us-
ing polarization-entangled photon pairs. Tsai et al. [23] used the entanglement
property of W-state to propose the first three-party SQSS protocol. Song et al.
[24] demonstrated a (t, n) threshold d-level quantum secret sharing scheme. A
verifiable (t, n) threshold quantum secret sharing scheme was proposed using
the d-dimensional Bell state and the Lagrange interpolation by Yang et al. in
Ref. [25]. Hao et al. [26] put forward a secret sharing scheme using the mutually
unbiased bases on the p2-dimensional quantum system. Bai et al. [27] proposed
the concept of decomposition of quantum access structure to design a quantum
secret sharing scheme. In Ref. [28], Liu et al. study the local distinguishabil-
ity of the 15 kinds of seven-qudit quantum entangled states and then proposed
a (k, n) threshold quantum secret sharing scheme. A new improving quantum
secret sharing scheme was proposed by Xu et al. [29], in which more quantum
access structures can be realized by the scheme than the one proposed by Nasci-
mento et al. [30].
Although many schemes have been proposed, the verifiability and the flex-
ibility of the schemes are also important issues worth of consideration. In this
paper, we propose a hybrid and verifiable quantum secret sharing scheme based
on mutually unbiased bases and the monotone span program, which focuses on
transmitting a d-dimensional quantum state among the dealer Alice and par-
ticipants and the application of the linear secret sharing. Each participant in a
authorization set can perform a unitary transformation on the received particle
and send it to the next one until the last one sends it to Alice. They can recover
the secret by the linear secret sharing and the measurement value sent by Alice.
Verifiability ensures that the secret recovered in each authorization set is the
original one, and it also ensures that once a dishonest participant appears, he
will be found. Compared with the threshold scheme, the quantum secret sharing
scheme based on the access structure realizes the different influences of partici-
pants in the process of recovering secrets, thereby achieving the flexibility of the
scheme.
By comparison, our scheme shows all the advantages of the previous QSS
and the unique advantages, such as,
(1) It uses a qudit state instead of a qubit state.
(2) The participants can check the authenticity of the recovered secret.
(3) It needs fewer quantum resources and quantum operations.
(4) It has general access structure.
(5) It reduces the communication costs and computation complexity.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we illustrate the preliminary
knowledge related to the proposed scheme. The new proposed scheme is intro-
duced in section 3. Section 4 give a proof of the correctness, verifiability and
security of the proposed scheme. In section 5, we give an example to further
illustrate our proposed scheme. Finally, the comparison and conclusion is given
in section 6 and section 7.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the preliminary knowledge of our scheme.
2.1 Access structure
Defination 1 Let P = {P1, P2, · · · , Pn} be a set of participants, an access
structure Γ ⊆ 2P is a family of authorized sets of participants.
Defination 2 If Γ is the access structure on P , then any set in Γ is called
the authorization subset on P , which is called the authorization set for short. If
A ∈ Γ,A ⊆ B ⊆ P , then B ∈ Γ . The family of the unauthorized sets is called
an adversary structure, that is to say, Γ c=∆.
Example 1 Let P = {P1, P2, P3, P4} , Γ = {A1, A2, A3}, whereA1 = {P1, P2, P3},
A2 = {P1, P2, P4}, A3 = {P1, P2, P3, P4}. So
∆ =
{∅, {P1} , {P2} , {P3} , {P4} , {P1, P2} , {P1, P3} , {P1, P4} ,
{P2, P3} , {P2, P4} , {P3, P4} , {P1, P3, P4} {P2, P3, P4}
}
.
2.2 Monotone span program
MSP was introduced in Ref.[31] by Karchmer and Wigderson as a model of
computation to design the linear secret sharing scheme.
Defination 3 M (F ,M, ψ, ξ) is a monotone span program(MSP), where M is
a k× l matrix over a finite field F , ψ : {1, 2, · · · , k} → P is a surjective labeling
map, ξ = (1, 0, · · · , 0)T ∈ F l is defined as the target vector. For any A ⊆ P =
{P1, P2, · · · , Pn}, there is a corresponding eigenvector δA = (δ1, δ2, · · · , δn) ∈
{0, 1}n if and only if Pi ∈ A, δi = 1. The Boolean function f : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1} , f (δA) = 1 represents the corresponding ε rows of M , where ψ (ε) ∈
A, ε ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}.
Defination 4 A monotone span program (MSP) is called a MSP for access
structure Γ , if it can be satisfied that ∀A ∈ Γ ,∃λA ∈ Fk ⇒ MTAλA = ξ, and
∀A ∈ ∆ ,∃h = (1, h2, · · · , hl) ∈ F l ⇒ MAh = 0 ∈ Fm.
Example 2M (F ,M, ψ, ξ) is an MSP of access structure Γ as shown in example
1, where F = Z5,ψ (i) = Bobi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4},ξ = (1, 0, 0, 0)T ,M =


1 0 3 4
0 0 2 1
3 4 1 0
1 2 4 0

.
Therefore, λA1 = (1, 1, 0)
T ,λA2 = (1, 1, 0)
T ,λA3 = (1, 1, 3, 4)
T
.
2.3 Linear secret sharing
Monotone span program is utilized to design the linear secret sharing scheme,
which is aimed that the dealer Alice shares a secret s among k shareholders
Bob1, Bob2, · · · , Bobk according to the MSP for access structure Γ . It includes
the following two phases as follows.
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Distribution phase
Alice prepares a random vector ρ = (s, ρ2, · · · , ρl)T ∈ l and computes s =
Mρ = (s1, · · · , sk)T . Then, she sends si to ψ (i) via a secure channel.
Reconstruction phase
Let sA be indicated the vector for the authorized set A. The participants in
A restore the secrets cooperatively as follows.
sTAλA = (MAρ)
T
λA = ρ
T
(
MTAλA
)
= ρT ξ = s. (1)
2.4 Necessary quantum properties
Defination 5 Mutually unbiased base is defined that two sets of standard or-
thogonal bases A1 = {|ϕ1〉 , |ϕ2〉 , · · · , |ϕd〉} and A2 = {|ψ1〉 , |ψ2〉 , · · · , |ψd〉},
which defined over a d-dimensional complex space Cd in Ref.[32,33] , if the fol-
lowing relationship is satisfied
|〈ϕi |ψi〉| = 1√
d
. (2)
If any two of the set of standard orthogonal bases {A1, A2, · · · , Am} in space are
unbiased, then this set is called an unbiased bases set. Besides, it can be found
d+ 1 mutually unbiased bases if d is an odd prime number.
Defination 6 The computation base is expressed as {|k〉 |k ∈ D}, and the re-
maining groups can be expressed as:
∣∣∣v(j)l 〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
wk(l+jk) |k〉, (3)
where
∣∣∣v(j)l 〉 represents the l-th vector in the j-th bases, w = e 2piid l, j ∈ D, D =
{0, 1, · · · , d− 1}. These mutually unbiased bases satisfy the following conditions:∣∣∣∣〈v(j)l
∣∣∣∣v(j′)l
〉∣∣∣∣ = 1√
d
, j 6= j′. (4)
Defination 7 In Ref.[34], the two unitary transformations Xd and Yd that we
need to use in this paper can be expressed as:
Xd =
d−1∑
m=0
wm |m〉 〈m|, Yd =
d−1∑
m=0
wm
2 |m〉 〈m|. (5)
Implementing (5) on
∣∣∣v(j)l 〉 in turn, we can obtain:
XxdY
y
d
∣∣∣v(j)l 〉 = ∣∣∣v(j+y)l+x 〉 . (6)
For the convenience of expression, XxdY
y
d is denoted as Ux,y, that is,
Ux,y
∣∣∣v(j)l 〉 = ∣∣∣v(j+y)l+x 〉 . (7)
QSS 5
3 Proposed scheme
In this section, we construct a verifiable quantum secret sharing scheme that
includes a dealer Alice and n shareholders Bob1, Bob2, · · · , Bobn. The access
structure Γ can be expressed as Γ = {A1, A2, · · · , Ar}, where Ai(i = 1, 2, · · · , r)
is a authorization set. For the convenience of description, the authorization set
is recorded as Ai =
{
Bob
(i)
1 , Bob
(i)
2 , · · · , Bob(i)m
}
, (1 ≤ m ≤ n). Without losing
generality, it is assumed that the participants in the authorization set Ai ={
Bob
(i)
1 , Bob
(i)
2 , · · · , Bob(i)m
}
want to recover the secret s. The specific steps of
the scheme are as follows.
3.1 Distribution phase
Alice implements the following steps.
3.1.1 Select a random vector ρ = (Si, ρ2, ρ3 · · · , ρl)T according to authorization
set Ai.
3.1.2 Calculate s = Mn×lρ =
(
s
(i)
1 , s
(i)
2 , , · · · , s(i)n
)T
, i = 1, 2, · · · , r and send
s
(i)
j to ψ(j) = Bobj(j = 1, 2, · · · , n) through the quantum secure channel.
3.1.3 Compute and publish H1 = h(Si),H2 = h(s), where h() is a public Hash
function.
3.1.4 Prepare a quantum state |φ〉 = ∣∣ϕ00〉 = 1√d d−1∑
j=0
|j〉 and perform a unitary
operation U
p
(i)
0 ,q
(i)
0
to get the quantum state |φ〉(i)0 = Up(i)0 ,q(i)0
∣∣ϕ00〉 =
∣∣∣∣ϕq(i)0p(i)0
〉
,
where p
(i)
0 = s is the secret, q
(i)
0 is a secret value known only to Alice. Then, she
sends the quantum state |φ〉(i)0 performed by the unitary operation to the first
participant Bob
(i)
1 in the authorization set Ai.
3.2 Reconstruction phase
Participants in Ai =
{
Bob
(i)
1 , Bob
(i)
2 , · · · , Bob(i)m
}
, (1 ≤ m ≤ n) can recover the
secret by the following steps.
3.2.1 After receiving the quantum state |φ〉0, the first participant Bob(i)1 per-
forms unitary operates U
p
(i)
1 ,q
(i)
1
on it and gets the quantum state |φ〉(i)1 = Up(i)1 ,q(i)1∣∣∣∣ϕq(i)0p(i)0
〉
=
∣∣∣∣ϕq(i)0 +q(i)1p(i)0 +p(i)1
〉
. Next, the quantum state |φ〉(i)1 is sent to the second par-
ticipant Bob
(i)
2 in the authorization set Ai, where p
(i)
1 = λ
(i)
1 s
(i)
1 , q
(i)
1 = λ
(i)
1 .
3.2.2 The other participants Bob
(i)
j (j = 2, 3, · · · ,m) in the authorization set Ai
perform the same operation as in step 3.2.1, which means that after receiving
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the quantum state |φ〉(i)j−1, Bob(i)j performs unitary operation Up(i)j ,q(i)j on it and
gets the quantum state |φ〉(i)j = Up(i)j ,q(i)j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ϕ
j−1∑
k=0
q
(i)
k
j−1∑
k=0
p
(i)
k
〉
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣ϕ
j∑
k=0
q
(i)
k
j∑
k=0
p
(i)
k
〉
, and then sends
it to the next participant Bob
(i)
j+1, (j = 2, 3, · · ·m − 1) until the last participant
Bob
(i)
m in the authorization set Ai completes the operation and sends the final
quantum state to Alice, where p
(i)
j = λ
(i)
j s
(i)
j , q
(i)
j = λ
(i)
j . For the authorization
set Ai, when all the participants act and transmit, the final quantum state is
|φ〉(i)m =
m∏
k=0
U
p
(i)
k
,q
(i)
k
∣∣ϕ00〉 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ϕ
m∑
k=0
q
(i)
k
m∑
k=0
p
(i)
k
〉
. (8)
3.2.3 When Alice receives the final quantum state |φ〉(i)m , she can know that it
satisfies the following condition on account of q
(i)
0 , q
(i)
1 , · · · , q(i)m ,
q
(i)
0 + q
(i)
1 + · · ·+ q(i)m = qi. (9)
She selects the measurement bases Mqi =
{∣∣∣ϕ(qi)j 〉 |j ∈ D} to measure it, and
then infers the following condition should be established in the authorization set
Ai
p
(i)
0 + p
(i)
1 + · · ·+ p(i)m = p(i)0 + Si = ri (10)
If it is established, Alice checks whether H1 of the participants are equal to the
published one. If so, the measurement results ri will be sent to all participants
in the authorization set Ai through the secure channel and then it move to the
next step. If not, the scheme is terminated.
3.2.4 In order to reconstruct the secret, each participant in authorization set Ai
can recover the secret by calculating s = p0 = ri −
m∑
i=1
pi = ri − Si.
4 Correctness, verifiability and security
In this section, the provability of the correctness, verifiability and security of our
scheme is given.
4.1 Correctness
Theorem 1 If a d-dimensional quantum state in mutually unbiased bases is∣∣∣v(j)l 〉 = 1√d d−1∑
k=0
wk(l+jk) |k〉, and a unitary operation Ux,y = XxdY yd is performed
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on it, then it will become another state
∣∣∣v(j+y)l+x 〉, that is, Ux,y ∣∣∣v(j)l 〉 = ∣∣∣v(j+y)l+x 〉.
Proof When implementing Y yd , X
x
d on
∣∣∣v(j)l 〉 in turn, we can obtain,
XxdY
y
d
∣∣∣v(j)l 〉 = Xxd
(
d−1∑
m=0
wym
2 |m〉 〈m|
)(
1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
wk(l+jk) |k〉
)
= 1√
d
d−1∑
m=0
wxm |m〉 〈m|
d−1∑
k=0
wk(l+(j+y)k ) |k〉
= 1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
wk[(l+x)+(j+y)k] |k〉
=
∣∣∣v(j+y)l+x 〉 .
(11)
This completes the proof.
Lemma 1 In the secret sharing scheme, according to Theorem 1, the initial
state selected by Alice is |φ〉 = ∣∣ϕ00〉 = 1√d d−1∑
j=0
|j〉, and the unitary operation
U
p
(i)
k
,q
(i)
k
= X
p
(i)
k
d Y
q
(i)
k
d , k = 0, 1, · · · ,m is performed on the states sequentially by
Alice and all the participants in the authorization set Ai, then the final state is
|φ〉(i)m =
(
m∏
u=0
Upu,qu
)
|φ〉, that is, |φ〉(i)m =
m∏
k=0
U
p
(i)
k
,q
(i)
k
∣∣ϕ00〉 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ϕ
m∑
k=0
q
(i)
k
m∑
k=0
p
(i)
k
〉
.When
Alice announces the measurement result ri via the quantum secure channel to
the participants in Ai, they can restore the secret s = p0 = ri−
m∑
k=1
p
(i)
k = ri−Si.
4.2 Verifiability
On one hand, before Alice sends the measurement result, she can check H1 to
ensure that the secret value recovered by linear secret sharing is correct, which
provides a prerequisite for participants to recover the correct secret. On the other
hand ,each participant can check
H2 = h (s) , (12)
to ensure that the recovered secret is the original one.
4.3 Security
We analyze the security of our scheme against the general attacks here.
Entangle and measure attack We assume that eavesdropper Eve intercepts
the particles sent among Alice and the participants and then uses a unitary
operation UE to entangle an ancillary state |E〉 on the transmitted particle.
In order to steal secret information by measuring the ancillary state, Eve act
the unitary operator UE on |E〉 and the transmitted particle. To simplify the
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description, we consider the bases corresponding to j = 0, namely,
∣∣∣v(0)l 〉 =
1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
wkl |k〉, so
UE |k〉 |E〉 =
d−1∑
h=0
akh |h〉 |ekh〉, (13)
UE
∣∣∣v(0)l 〉 |E〉 = UE
(
1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
wkl |k〉
)
|E〉
= 1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
wkl
(
d−1∑
h=0
akh |h〉 |ekh〉
)
= 1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
d−1∑
h=0
wklakh
(
1√
d
d−1∑
m=0
w−hm
∣∣∣v(0)m 〉
)
|ekh〉
= 1
d
d−1∑
k=0
d−1∑
h=0
d−1∑
m=0
wkl−hmakh
∣∣∣v(0)m 〉 |ekh〉 ,
(14)
where w = e
2pii
d , |E〉 is the initial state of the auxiliary space, |ekh〉 are pure
ancillary states determined uniquely by the unitary operation UE , so
d−1∑
h=0
|akh|2 = 1, k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d− 1}. (15)
For the sake of avoiding the rising error rate, Eve has to set akh = 0, k, h ∈
{0, 1, · · · , d− 1} , k 6= h. Therefore, (11) And (12) can be simplified to
UE |k〉 |E〉 = akk |k〉 |ekk〉 , (16)
UE
∣∣∣v(0)l 〉 |E〉 = 1d
d−1∑
k=0
d−1∑
m=0
wk(l−m)akk
∣∣∣v(0)m 〉 |ekk〉 . (17)
Similarly, to avoid the eavesdropping check, Eve has to set
d−1∑
k=0
wk(l−m)akk |ekk〉 = 0, (18)
where m ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d− 1} ,m 6= l. For any l ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d− 1}, we can obtain
d equations
a00 |e00〉 = a11 |e11〉 = · · · = ad−1,d−1 |ed−1,d−1〉 . (19)
So, whatever quantum state Eve uses, he can only get the same information
from the auxiliary particles. Similar analysis can be used for the other quantum
states
∣∣∣v(j)l 〉 = 1√d d−1∑
k=0
wk(l+jk) |k〉, so the entanglement measurement attack is
invalid in our scheme.
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Intercept and resend attack The eavesdropper Eve intercepts the transmit-
ted particles among Alice and the participants and resends some forged particles.
For a simple description, we suppose that the eavesdropper Eve intercepts the
quantum state |φ〉k sent by Bob(i)k to Bob(i)k+1. However, he does not know any
information about the measurement bases and only chooses the correct measure-
ment bases with the probability of 1
d
to get measure outcome
p0 +
k∑
i=1
pi. (20)
Even if the result is measured with the probability of 1
d
, the secret information
cannot be obtained because pi, i ∈ {k + 1, · · · ,m} is unknown. If Alice shares
n secret information, the probability that eavesdropper succeed will be
(
1
d
)n
.
With the increase of the number of n, there will be lim
n→∞
(
1
d
)n
= 0. The other
is that Eve intercepts the si sent by Alice to the participants, but the si does
not carry any information of the secret. In short, Eve cannot obtain the secret
in intercept-and-resend attack.
Forgery attack If Alice shares a fake st to Bob
(i)
t , the secret s will not be
restored by the participants in Ai. If one or some of the participants perform
the false unitary operation, they will be found by Alice because the measure-
ment result will be inconsistent with Alice’s expectation. What’s more, even if
some dishonest participants performed the fake unitary transformation and Al-
ice successfully measured the expected result, there is no use for this attack.
Because the recovered secret s′ with H2
′ = h (s′) 6= H2 = h (s) guaranteed. So,
the forgery attack is useless.
Collusion attack If the participants in Bi, Bi ⊆ Ai collude to restore the
secret, they must obtain the s
(i)
k and λ
(i)
k of each participant in the authorization
set Ai to recover Si. When Bi ⊆ Ai, they can not get the other’s secret share
information, so this attack is unsuccessful.
5 Example
Here, we explain our scheme more clearly by giving an example.
Example 3 According to the MSP and the access structure Γ in the example
2, assuming Alice wants to share secret s = 3 ∈ Z5 among the four participants
Bob1, Bob2, Bob3, Bob4, she prepares a random vector ρ = (4, 1, 0, 2)
T
firstly and
then computes s = Mρ = (s1, s2, s3, s4)
T
= (2, 2, 1, 1)
T
. Next, she sends si to
Bobi, (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) via a secure channel and publishes H1 = h (4), H2 = h (3).
Without losing generality, we assume that the participants in A1 want to restore
the secret. The dealer Alice prepares a state |φ〉 = ∣∣ϕ00〉 = 1√5 4∑
i=0
|i〉 and performs
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Up0,q0 = U3,2 on it to obtain |φ〉0 = U3,2
∣∣ϕ00〉 = ∣∣ϕ23〉, where p0 = s = 3 is the
secret, q0 = 2 ∈ Z5 is a randomly selected secret value only known by Alice.
Next she sends the quantum state |φ〉0 =
∣∣ϕ23〉 to Bob1. After receiving |φ〉0 =∣∣ϕ23〉, Bob1 performs the unitary operation Uλ1s1,λ1 = U2,1 to get |φ〉1 = ∣∣ϕ30〉
and sends it to Bob2. When receiving |φ〉1 =
∣∣ϕ30〉, Bob2 performs the unitary
operationUλ2s2,λ2 = U2,1 to get |φ〉2 =
∣∣ϕ42〉 and sends to Bob3. After receiving
|φ〉2 =
∣∣ϕ42〉, Bob3 performs Uλ3s3,λ3 = U0,0 to get |φ〉3 = ∣∣ϕ42〉 and sends it
to Alice. For the authorization set A1, when all participants act and transmit
particle, the final quantum state is
|ϕ〉final =
(
3∏
i=0
Upi,qi
)∣∣ϕ00〉 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ϕ
3∑
i=0
qi
3∑
i=0
pi
〉
=
∣∣ϕ42〉 . (21)
In this case, Alice selects M4 =
{∣∣∣ϕ(4)j 〉 |j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}} to measure |ϕ〉 final
=
∣∣ϕ42〉 and records the measurement result r1. Afterwards, Alice checks whether
r1 = 2 and H1 = h(4) are true. If not, the scheme is terminated. If they are
established, the measurement result r1 is sent to each participant in A1 through
a quantum secure channel. After the participant receives it, the secret s can be
recovered as
s = p
(1)
0 = r1 − p(1)1 − p(1)2 − p(1)3 = r1 − λ(1)1 s(1)1 − λ(1)2 s(1)2 − λ(1)3 s(1)3 . (22)
That is s = 2− (2 + 2 + 0) = 3. Last but not least, they can check H1 to make
certain of the authenticity of the secret.
6 Comparison
In this section, we give a comparison among our scheme and other similar d-
dimensional QSS schemes[24,35,36] in terms of basic properties, computational
complexity and communication costs. The schemes in Ref.[24, 36] are the thresh-
old QSS, however the scheme in Ref. [35] and ours are the general access structure
QSS. The general access structure makes the level and influence of the partici-
pants different, making the scheme more flexible. They all use the Hash function
to make the verifiability of the d-dimensional QSS scheme. The scheme proposed
by Song et al.[24] shared a classical secret by utilizing polynomials according to
the Lagrange interpolation formula. The transformation of the particles includes
some operations such as d-level CNOT, QTF, Inverse QTF, and generalized
Pauli operator. However, the general access structure QSS is far more flexible
and practical than the threshold one. In Ref.[35], Mashhadi proposed a hybrid
secret sharing based on the quantum Fourier transform and monotone span pro-
gram, in which the participants recover the secret by means of measuring the
entangled state. The number of unitary operators is not much different in the
premise, while the number of required quantum states and the number of mea-
surement operations are greatly reduced, which consumes less quantum resources
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and the scheme is more practical. Qin et al.[36] put forward a verifiable (t, n)
threshold QSS using d-dimensional Bell state and they realize the authentication
of quantum state transmission by adding some decoy particles. According to the
Lagrange interpolation and the unitary operation, they can recover the secret
with measuring the final Bell state. The Specific comparison of basic property
among Ref.[24,35,36] and ours is given in Table 1. The comparison of the com-
putational complexity and communication costs of the general access structure
QSS[35] and the new is given in Table 2.
Table 1. Basic comparison among the QSS schemes
Property Song[24] Mashhadi[35] Qin[36] New
Model (t, n)threshold General (t, n)threshold General
Verification Hash function Hash function Hash function Hash function
Secret Classic Classic Classic Classic
Dimension d d d d
Method LI MSP,LC LI MSP,MUB,LC
NQO QFT ,QFT
−1,
Pauli
QFT ,Pauli UO UT
Table 2. Comparison of communication costs and computational complexity
Property Mashhadi[35] Ours
Number of message particles m− 1 1
Unitary operation m m+ 1
QTF 1 −
Measure operation m 1
Hash function 2 2
Remark 1. LI: Lagrange interpolation, MSP: Monotone span program, MUB:
Mutually unbiased bases, LC: Linear computation, NQO: necessary quantum
operation, QTF: Quantum Fourier Transform,QFT−1: Inverse Quantum Fourier
Transform, UO: Unitary operation, UT: Unitary transformation.
7 Conclusions
The verifiable quantum secret sharing scheme based on the access structure is
very useful in practice. In this paper, we construct a verifiable quantum secret
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sharing scheme based on the property of the mutually unbiased base and the
monotone span program. The dealer and participants in the authorization set can
restore secret through the transformation and transmission of a d-dimensional
quantum state as well as linear secret sharing. In addition, the correctness, veri-
fiability and security analysis of the scheme have been proved. Finally, a specific
example and a comparison are given to further clarify the advantages and prac-
ticality of our scheme.
For the future work,the verifiability of the scheme is analyzed from the view
that the recovered secret is consistent with the original one. However, the issue
of mutual authentication among the participants in the authorization set is still
worth studying.
References
1. Shor P W, Preskill J. Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distri-
bution Protocol. J. Physical Review Letters, 2000, 85(2): 441-444.
2. Lo H, Ma X, Chen K, et al. Decoy state quantum key distribution. J. Physical
Review Letters, 2005, 94(23): 230504-230504.
3. Chong S K, Hwang T. Quantum key agreement protocol based on BB84. J. Optics
Communications, 2010, 283(6): 1192-1195.
4. Liu B, Gao F, Huang W, et al. Multiparty quantum key agreement with single
particles. J. Quantum Information Processing, 2013, 12(4): 1797-1805.
5. Shukla C, Alam N, Pathak A, et al. Protocols of quantum key agreement solely
using Bell states and Bell measurement. J. Quantum Information Processing, 2014,
13(11): 2391-2405.
6. Deng F, Long G. Secure direct communication with a quantum one-time pad. J.
Physical Review A, 2004, 69(5).
7. Wang C, Deng F, Li Y S, et al. Quantum secure direct communication with high-
dimension quantum superdense coding. J. Physical Review A, 2005, 71(4).
8. Furusawa A, Sorensen J, Braunstein S L, et al. Unconditional Quantum Telepor-
tation. J. Science, 1998, 282(5389): 706-709.
9. Bouwmeester D, Pan J, Mattle K, et al. Experimental quantum teleportation. J.
Nature, 1997, 390(6660): 575-579.
10. Lee H, Hong C, Kim H, et al. Arbitrated quantum signature scheme with message
recovery. J. Physics Letters A, 2004, 321(5): 295-300.
11. Fei G, Sujuan Q, Fenzhuo G, et al. Cryptanalysis of the arbitrated quantum sig-
nature protocols. J. Physical Review A, 2011, 84(2).
12. Li X, Barnum H. QUANTUM AUTHENTICATION USING ENTANGLED
STATES. J. International Journal of Foundations of Computer Science, 2004,
15(04): 609-617.
13. Naseri M. Revisiting Quantum Authentication Scheme Based on Entanglement
Swapping. J. International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 2016, 55(5): 2428-2435.
14. Naseri M. Revisiting Quantum Authentication Scheme Based on Entanglement
Swapping. J. International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 2016, 55(5): 2428-2435.
15. Hillery M, Bu?ek V, Berthiaume A, et al. Quantum secret sharing. J. Physical
Review A, 1999, 59(3): 1829-1834.
16. Hsu L. Quantum secret-sharing protocol based on Grover’s algorithm. J. Physical
Review A, 2003, 68(2).
QSS 13
17. Xiao L, Long G, Deng F, et al. Efficient multiparty quantum-secret-sharing
schemes. J. Physical Review A, 2004, 69(5).
18. Sun Y, Wen Q, Gao F, et al. Multiparty quantum secret sharing based on Bell
measurement. J. Optics Communications, 2009, 282(17): 3647-3651.
19. Hsu J, Chong S, Hwang T, et al. Dynamic quantum secret sharing. J. Quantum
Information Processing, 2013, 12(1): 331-344.
20. Rahaman R, Parker M G. Quantum secret sharing based on local distinguishability.
J. Physical Review A, 2015, 91(2).
21. Wang J, Li L, Peng H, et al. Quantum-secret-sharing scheme based on local dis-
tinguishability of orthogonal multiqudit entangled states. J. Physical Review A,
2017, 95(2).
22. Williams B P, Lukens J M, Peters N A, et al. Quantum secret sharing with
polarization-entangled photon pairs. J. Physical Review A, 2019, 99(6).
23. Tsai C, Yang C, Lee N, et al. Semi-quantum secret sharing protocol using W-state.
J. Modern Physics Letters A, 2019, 34(27).
24. Song X, Liu Y, Deng H, et al. (t, n) Threshold d-Level Quantum Secret Sharing.
J. Scientific Reports, 2017, 7(1).
25. Yang Y, Jia X, Wang H, et al. Verifiable quantum (k, n)-threshold secret sharing.
J. Quantum Information Processing, 2012, 11(6): 1619-1625.
26. Hao, N., Li, Z., Bai, H. et al. A New Quantum Secret Sharing Scheme Based on
Mutually Unbiased Bases. Int J Theor Phys 58, 1249C1261 (2019).
27. Bai, C., Li, Z., Si, M. et al. Quantum secret sharing for a general quantum access
structure. Eur. Phys. J. D 71, 255 (2017).
28. Liu, C., Li, Z., Bai, C. et al. Quantum-Secret-Sharing Scheme Based on Local
Distinguishability of Orthogonal Seven-Qudit Entangled States. Int J Theor Phys
57, 428C442 (2018).
29. Xu, T., Li, Z., Bai, C. et al. A New Improving Quantum Secret Sharing Scheme.
Int J Theor Phys 56, 1308C1317 (2017).
30. Nascimento A C, Muellerquade J, Imai H, et al. Improving Quantum Secret-
Sharing Schemes. J. Physical Review A, 2001, 64(4).
31. Karchmer M, Wigderson A. On span programs. C. structure in complexity theory
annual conference, 1993: 102-111.
32. Ivonovic I D. Geometrical description of quantal state determination. J. Journal
of Physics A, 1981, 14(12): 3241-3245.
33. Wootters W K , Fields B D . Optimal state-determination by mutually unbiased
measurements. J. Annals of Physics, 1989, 191(2):363-381.
34. Tavakoli A, Herbauts I, Zukowski M, et al. Secret sharing with a single d -level
quantum system. J. Physical Review A, 2015, 92(3).
35. Mashhadi S. General secret sharing based on quantum Fourier transform. J. Quan-
tum Information Processing, 2019, 18(4).
36. Qin H, Dai Y. Verifiable (t,n) threshold quantum secret sharing using d-
dimensional Bell state. J. Information Processing Letters, 2016, 116(5): 351-355.
